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Abstract: Inspection authorities such as the Port State Control Memoranda of Understanding use
different policies and targeting methods to select vessels for inspections and rely primarily on past
inspection outcomes. One of the main goals of inspections is to improve the safety quality of vessels
and to reduce the probability of future incidents. This study shows there is room for improvement
in targeting vessels for inspections and in determining vessel-specific inspection priority areas
(e.g., bridge management versus machinery related items). For the year 2018, sixty percent of vessels
that experienced very serious or serious (VSS) incidents were not selected for inspection up to three
months prior to the incident and forty percent of the vessels that were inspected still had incidents of
which only four percent were detained. Furthermore, one can observe a very low correlation (−0.04)
between the probabilities of detention and incidents (VSS) for the year 2018. The proposed approach
treats detention and incident types as separate risk dimensions and evaluates seven targeting methods
against random selection of vessels using empirical data for 2018. The analysis is based on three
comprehensive data sets that cover the world fleet and shows potential gains (reduction of false
negative events) of 14–27 percent compared to random selection. This can be further improved by
adding eight inspection priority risk areas that help inspectors to focus inspections by providing
insight in the individual risk profile of vessels. Policy makers can further customize the approach
by classifying the risk of vessels into categories and by selecting inspection targets and benchmark
samples. A small application example is provided to demonstrate feasibility of the proposed approach
for policy makers and inspection authorities.
Keywords: vessel inspection policy; vessel-specific risk; detention risk; incident risk; priority areas;
false negatives
1. Introduction
This manuscript evaluates and challenges the status quo practice of the maritime industry to
primarily use past Port State Control inspection outcomes to target future risky vessels for inspections
as highlighted by Knapp [1]. The primary goal is to develop a method and possibly a practical tool
that can be used by maritime administrations or integrated into their systems with the aim to enhance
the detection of risky vessels and to reduce false negative events—in short to have a more proactive
approach to inspection selection. The development of the method builds on work of Knapp and
Franses [2], Heij et al. [3] and Heij and Knapp [4] to select vessels for inspections with the highest
benefit (reduction in risk) and to treat detention and incident risk as separate risk dimensions in order
to reduce false negative events. A false negative event is an event where the targeting method classifies
a vessel as low risk, but in reality, this vessel is a risky vessel. If a vessel is classified as low risk based
on detention risk only, the vessel does not get targeted but can experience an incident with (very)
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serious consequences. If this happens, the inspection regime failed the opportunity to inspect the vessel
and to improve its safety quality because inspections reduce incident risk, as is well established in the
literature [5–9]. Ji et al. [10] demonstrate that using incident data besides detention data improves the
evaluation of registries and subsequent selection of ships for inspections.
The literature on Port State Control covers various topics such as the evaluation of the effectiveness
of Port State Control regimes [1,9] or the use of past deficiencies to predict future risk or to guide
inspectors to find more deficiencies [11–14] but the standard assumption remains that detention equals
incident risk. This manuscript challenges this assumption and presents a methodology that treats
incident risk and detention as two separate risk dimensions. This line of thinking is in line with
Yang et al. [15,16] and Luo and Shin [17] who suggest more proactive approaches. Since vessels benefit
from an inspection and this effect can be measured quantitatively [3,6], the probability of incident
is reduced if an inspection is performed. This, however, is not necessarily due to a detention as
demonstrated by Heij et al. [3] who show a low correlation between the probability of detention and
incident and Bijwaard et al. [6] who use survival analysis to analyze ship cycles over a long time period.
The goal of inspections is to raise the safety quality of vessels in order to prevent future incidents
rather than preventing future detentions. By combining the two risk dimensions, false negative events
can be reduced since the riskiest vessels benefit most from an inspection. This study is based on three
sets of databases and data feeds containing global incident, inspection, and ship-particular data of the
world fleet (73,905 vessels).
The analysis confirms the importance of the two risk dimensions and the need to improve targeting
ships for inspections, since during the year 2018, 60 percent of vessels that experienced very serious
or serious (VSS) incidents were not selected for inspection up to three months prior to the incident.
The analysis also highlights the need to improve selection of vessel-specific inspection priority risk
areas, since 40 percent of the vessels there were inspected still had incidents and only 4 percent were
detained. In addition, one can observe a very low correlation (–0.04) between the probabilities of
detention and incidents (VSS) for the year 2018. The included incident type risks are those classified
as total loss and very serious and serious incidents (VSS) according to the International Maritime
Organization’s definitions [18]. Less serious incidents and near misses are excluded here due to their
high degree of underreporting as noted by Hassel et al. [19].
With the above philosophy in mind to treat detention and incident (VSS) as separate risk
dimensions and with an established need for improvement, the presented approach extends Heij
and Knapp [4] who consider three combined methods and use three months of empirical data (the
first quarter of 2018) to evaluate them. The approach presented here uses five combined methods,
by which we mean methods that combine the information present in past detention data and past
incident data. By using percentiles instead of estimated (logit) risk probability levels, the analysis
becomes robust against size distortions of the logit probabilities that arise because of data limitations.
The five combined methods are evaluated along with the eight priority areas using empirical data
for the whole year of 2018. Furthermore, the presented approach allows for the combination of an
automated data-driven part with qualitative aspects. Data-driven approaches have been proposed
previously [1,11–14] but exclude other components included here, such as accounting for two different
risk dimensions and addition of inspection priority areas. The data-driven part here provides the risk
profiles of individual vessels for eight vessel inspection priority risk areas and combines detention and
incident (VSS) risk into one metric to enhance targeting. This data-driven part can be combined with
other intelligence and expert knowledge of inspectors to finalize inspection selection and execution.
An application example is provided to demonstrate feasibility.
2. Data and Methodology
The analysis is based on a unique and comprehensive combination of databases, data feeds and
methods and follows a systematic step by step approach which is explained below.
Step 1: Estimation of Risk Formulas
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The first step is to create the data matrix to estimate risk formulas. The formulas are estimated by
using logit models and the underlying matrix used was from the years 2010 to 2014 covering the world
fleet. For more details on the underlying statistical models used including a list of variables that are
evaluated, we refer to Knapp and Franses [20] and Knapp [21]. Separate risk formulas are estimated
for each incident type of interest and for detention. The formulas can be used for a maximum of three
to five years and will then need to be re-estimated.
Step 2: Estimate Probabilities Using Data Feeds from 2018
The second step is to use the derived risk formulas of Step 1 and, using input data feeds from
2018, to estimate probabilities at ship level for each of the four quarters of 2018. This is necessary
because the main interest is to estimate the probabilities valid at a specific point in time. Since quarterly
input data feeds for the year 2018 were available, those were used to estimate the probabilities using
custom—made software that can process the input data feeds, calculate the input parameters needed
to apply the risk formulas and estimate the probabilities. Ten risk formulas are selected that cover
targeting and vessel inspection priority areas resulting in a total of 2.9 million probabilities.
Step 3: Calculate Percentile Ranks
The probabilities of Step 2 form the basis to calculate percentile ranks of vessels. Percentile ranks
are useful to rank vessels according to their risk and to construct classes of vessels with roughly
comparable risk and especially classes where such risk is relatively high. An advantage of using
percentiles instead of estimated (logit) risk probability levels is that these percentiles are robust against
size distortions of the logit probabilities as percentile ranks are not affected by size distortions. As a
benchmark sample, the global fleet is used as the basis and the percentile ranks are calculated of the five
methods that are evaluated combining detention and incident (VSS) percentile ranks. The percentile
ranks of the inspection priority areas are also calculated but not combined with detention. In addition,
percentile ranks are also used to classify vessels using five risk categories (1 = very high to 5 = very
low risk). The output of this step is 4.4 million percentile ranks and form the basis for evaluation and
validation. Different benchmark samples could be used such as for instance benchmarking only vessels
that arrive in a specific geographic location in order to zoom into those vessels of interest if the global
fleet is not adequate. The proposed method is very flexible and can easily be adjusted to zoom into
particular geographic locations.
Step 4: Validate Targeting Methods Using Empirical Data from 2018
The last step is to validate the methods from Step 3 against empirical data from 2018 using three
validation variables (detention only, incidents only, and detention and incidents combined).
Table 1 lists the data sources, time frames, and number of observations for the databases and
data feeds that form the basis for the four steps mentioned above. Appendix A (Table A1) provides
descriptive statistics by ship type for all databases and data feeds used in this analysis. For Step 1,
historical data is used to estimate risk formulas. For Steps 2 to 4, we use data input feeds with ship
and various histories (changes in ship particulars as well as inspection and incident type histories)
at a particular time to estimate probabilities at a specific time. The global inspection data comprises
data from over seventy countries from eight Port State Control Memoranda of Understanding (MoU’s).
Incident data had to be combined and manually reclassified using IMO definitions [18] since different
data providers use different definitions of seriousness. In addition, for each incident the first event of
the chain of events was identified since that is needed for the incident type models for the eight-vessel
inspection priority risk areas. In addition, the various types of consequences are recorded for
each incident.
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Table 1. Data sources used in the analysis.
Data Used for: Time Frame and Numberof Observations Data Types and Sources
Estimating risk formulas
(incident, VSS and
8 incident types)
Jan 2010 to Dec 2014
376,508 total observations
8874 VSS incidents
Ship-particular data from IHSM
Global PSC inspection data
Global incident data from IMO, IHSM and LLI
Estimating risk formulas
(detention)
Jan 2010 to Dec 2014
158,187 inspections
6458 detentions
Estimating probabilities
(detention and incident types)
Dec 2017 to Sept 2018
73,905 vessels per period
295,620 for 4 periods
Quarterly data feeds of incident, inspection and
ship particular data from IMO, IHSM and LLI
Validating methods
Jan 2018 to Dec 2018
1868 detentions
756 VSS incidents
Global quarterly incidents and detention feeds
(756 incidents when counting incident by
quarter by IMO without duplicates, and
817 incidents when counting duplicates)
Note: All data is for the world fleet with 73,905 vessels, excluding fishing vessels and tugs, and with the following
status codes: in service, commission, laid-up, launched, in casualty or repair, converting, US Reserve Fleet. Further,
VSS denotes very serious and serious incidents including total loss.
To ensure that results are not biased due to underreporting of less serious incidents and near
misses [19], this study concentrates on very serious (including total loss) and serious incidents
(VSS). Ship particular data contains standard information such as ship type, age, size, flag, company
(e.g., beneficial owner, class society, safety management company), construction (engine information,
shipyard country), previous incidents and inspection outcomes. Tugs and fishing vessels are excluded,
and ship types are grouped into six main groups: general cargo, dry bulk, container, tanker, passenger,
and other types. To estimate probabilities at the ship level, the data feed contains quarterly data feeds
for 2018 from the same sources shown in Table 1 for 73,905 vessels, which are out-of-sample data
compared to the data for 2010–2014 used to estimate the risk formulas.
The risk formulas used in this analysis are based on logit models following the methodology
of the selection of variables from Knapp [1,21] and Knapp and Franses [2,5]. The logit model
estimates the probability (p) of an event of interest such as detention or incidents (VSS) by means of
p = exp(xb)/(1 + exp(xb)), where ‘exp’ denotes the exponential function and ‘x’ is the set of vessel-specific
variables (e.g., ship type, size, age, flag, classification society, beneficial owner, engine designer, ship
yard country). Over 500 variables (including counting dummies for categorical ones) are considered
initially. The database to estimate the incident type models has one observation per vessel per year
whereas the database to estimate the detention model has multiple observations per vessel per year
since vessels can be inspected various times per year. The models are specified by backward elimination
by removing insignificant factors (at the 5% significance level). The largest of the resulting models for
incidents (VSS) contains 172 variables while the smallest contains 16 (for fire and explosion). All models
are estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood as by Greene [22] to allow for possible misspecification
of the assumed underlying distribution function for logit models. The employed logit models are
described in more detail in Knapp [21] and Heij and Knapp [4].
Table 2 lists the resulting risk models that form the basis for Step 2 of the methodology. The incident
type models serve as proxy to inspection related focus areas, where separate models are used for
collisions, powered groundings, main engine failures, and drift groundings.
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Table 2. Models chosen for this analysis and their related risk priority inspection areas.
Acronym Model Type Use of Model
DET Detention For targeting—to combine with VSS
VSS Incident (very seriousand serious) For targeting—to combine with detention
COLL Collision (VSS) and Collision and powered groundings are both proxies to passage
planning, bridge management, crew qualification
POWGRD Powered grounding(VSS)
ENG Main engine failures(VSS) and
Engine failures and drift groundings are both proxies to main
engine failures, black outs, emergency procedures
DRFTGRD Drift grounding (VSS)
FIRE Fire and explosion (VSS) Proxy to fire related aspects, emergency procedures
HULL Hull failure (VSS) Proxy to maintenance related issues including tanks and waterintegrity
LIFE Loss of life (VSS) Proxy to occupational safety, safety management, lifeboats
POL Pollution (VSS) Proxy to pollution prevention and emergency response
Since the effect of risk factors changes over time as they proxy how industry responds to market
conditions and legislative changes, the risk formulas need to be updated every three to five years.
Based on the data from 2010 to 2014, the effects of vessel age and size for VSS incident risk are opposite
to those for detention risk. Since the detention model reflects actual Port State Control Memoranda
of Understanding (MoU) decisions in practice, this indicates that no incident information is part
of the targeting routine. This finding relates to one of the main messages of this paper that past
incident information is relevant for targeting vessels for inspection to reduce future incidents (VSS).
It also demonstrates that the inspection data is biased since it reflects the various targeting policies of
coastal states.
Step 2 involves the estimation of ship-specific probabilities using quarterly input data feeds for
2018 and using the risk formulas obtained under Step 1. The input data feeds cover the global fleet
of 73,905 individual vessels and cover the following six ship types: general cargo (23.8%), dry bulk
carriers (15.7%), container vessels (7%), tankers (22.1%), passenger vessels (9.7%) and all other ship
types (excluding fishing vessels, tugs and commercial yachts) (21.7%).
The calculation of the probabilities was performed by means of a customized software program
resulting in 2.9 million probabilities that form the basis for the development and testing of the targeting
methods shown in Table 3. The software processes the data feeds, calculates the input parameters to
be applied for the risk formulas and estimates the probabilities. The probabilities are converted into
percentile ranks using as benchmark the global fleet in each of the four quarters.
Percentile ranks provide a useful way for policy makers to understand where a particular vessel
stands with respect to all other vessels in the benchmark sample, which could be adjusted to regional
preferences (e.g., all vessels that arrived in a particular region over the last three years) rather than
using the global fleet as benchmark. Table 3 shows the five combined targeting methods (A, B, C,
D and E) and the two stand-alone (detention, incidents) that were evaluated based on 4.4 million
percentile ranks.
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Table 3. Targeting methods evaluated.
Targeting Methods Description
Detention (only) Vessels are ranked by percentile ranks from detention probabilities only.
Incidents (only) Vessels are ranked by percentile ranks from VSS incident type probability(TLVSS = total loss, very serious and serious).
Combined methods – combining percentile ranks of detention and VSS:
Method A (max) Vessels are ranked by the highest of the two base percentile ranks
Method B (min) Vessels are ranked by the lowest of the two base percentile ranks
Method C (weight) Vessels are ranked by a weight of 50/50 incident to detention
Method D (weight) Vessels are ranked by a weight of 75/25 incident to detention
Method E (weight) Vessels are ranked by a weight of 25/75 incident to detention
In order to classify vessels based on their percentile ranks, five risk categories are chosen as shown
in Table 4 along with a color coding for the five risk categories to help visualize the risk categories.
The suggested target inspection coverage is flexible and can be set by policy makers considering the
country’s (or group of countries in the case of a PSC MoU) risk appetite, regional priorities and arrival
profiles, inspection policies (e.g., to inspect vessels every six months, to inspect all passenger vessels
etc.) and resources. To test feasibility, the suggested yearly target inspection coverage was applied
to ship arrival data for 2018 of one country containing 34 thousand arrivals in port (6065 unique
IMOs) with average daily arrival rate of 95 vessels and average daily inspection rate of eight vessels.
Applying the above target inspection coverage using Method B, the same average yearly figures were
obtained, that is a daily average inspection rate of eight vessels, making the suggested coverage feasible.
In addition, it is recommended to add some random selectin to the inspection coverage for the lower
risk coverage areas.
Table 4. Risk categories and suggested yearly target inspection coverage.
Risk Category Percentile Rank Suggested Target Inspection Coverage
RC1: Very high risk 90 to 100 100%
RC2: High risk 80 to 89 100%
RC3: Medium risk 70 to 79 90%
RC4: Low risk 60 to 69 10% random selection
RC5: Very low risk 0 to 59 5% random selection
At the global level and based on unique IMO numbers, the quarterly average inspection rate is
21.2% while the yearly average inspection rate is 41.6%. The determination of the target inspection
coverage will depend on regional inspection capacities and trade flows and it is recommended to
custom tailor those to the respective country or region. Table 4 is only provided as example on what
would be feasible given the inspection capacity of one country. Furthermore, the inspection coverage
should be re-evaluated yearly to adjust to changes in the trade flows which will determine the type of
vessels that trade in a region.
3. Evaluation of Targeting Methods
To evaluate the various proposed targeting methods, three evaluation variables were considered:
incidents (VSS); detentions; incidents and detentions combined (the vessel was either detained or had
an incident within the relevant time period). The evaluation time periods are specified as follows,
since estimated probabilities are only valid up to a maximum of three months:
• P1: Probabilities estimated as of late Dec 2017—empirical data from Jan to March 2018;
• P2: Probabilities estimated as of late March 2018—empirical data from April to June 2018;
• P3: Probabilities estimated as of late June 2018—empirical data from July to Sept 2018;
• P4: Probabilities estimated as of late Sept 2018—empirical data from Oct to Dec 2018.
Safety 2020, 6, 18 7 of 21
One way to visualize how well the targeting methods perform compared to random selection
of vessels is via ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curves that plot the true positive rate (TPR)
on the Y-axis against the false positive rate (FPR) on the X-axis. Figures 1–3 provide ROC curves for
the three evaluation variables, zooming into the top 30% of all vessels, which represents the top three
risk categories (RC1 to RC3). Any curve above the diagonal line (random selection) constitutes an
improvement. Appendix B (Figures A1–A3) provides the complete ROC curves.
One can observe that all methods perform better than random selection except for the detention
method (using detention only) for the evaluation variable incidents (VSS). This is understandable
given the small correlation (–0.046) between the two which also confirms that vessels with a high
probability of detention do not necessarily have a high probability of incident (VSS) and that the two
need to be treated as different risk dimensions.
Note: Y-axis: true positive rate, X-axis: false positive rate
Figure 1. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve top 30%—evaluation variable incidents (VSS):
total incidents 756.
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Note: Y-axis: true positive rate, X-axis: false positive rate
Figure 2. ROC curve top 30%—evaluation variable detention: total detentions 1868.
Note: Y-axis: true positive rate, X-axis: false positive rate
Figure 3. ROC curve top 30%—evaluation variable VSS and detention combined: total count 2589.
At the global level, 60.2% of all incidents (VSS) were not selected for inspection up to three months
prior to the incident. Of the 39.8% vessels that were inspected, 4.4% were detained indicating that
vessel inspection priority risk areas could be improved in order to focus inspection efforts and to
reduce incidents from happening. Restricting this to very serious incidents (VS) only, 75.4% were not
selected for inspection and 3.3% were detained. After excluding cases with heavy or severe weather
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conditions, only 42.1% (VSS) and 34.3% (VS) of vessels with incidents were selected for inspection up
to three months prior to the incident.
Method D on the other hand would have selected 44.8% of all vessels with VSS incidents and
39.3% of all vessels with vs. incidents in the top three risk categories (RC1 to RC3). Taking different
inspection rates into account and if random selection is set to factor 1 for comparison reasons, the 44.8%
classification rate of Method D translates to 1.49 compared to random selection (44.8% divided by
30%). Besides visualization by ROC curves, the improvement over random selection of vessels in
terms of reduction of the false negative rate is quantified in Table 5. Note that the false negative rate is
the opposite of the true positive rate (in the sense that both rates add up to 100 percent). To test the
significance of differences in success rates across methods, the Satterthwaite Welch t-test is performed
(Appendix C—Table A2 shows detailed results for some methods).
The results confirm that all methods are significantly better than random selection except for
the method DET (using detention only) for the evaluation variable VSS. For the evaluation variable
incidents (VSS), Method D performs best at the top 30% level which combines the first three risk
categories (RC 1 to 3) while method VSS performs best at the top 10% level (RC1) followed closely by
Method D. The Satterthwaite Welch t-test however confirms no significant difference between method
VSS and Method D at the top 10% or top 30% level but confirms that Method B and using detention only
vary significantly compared to method VSS or Method D. Method D gives more weight to incidents
but also accounts for detention risk to capture vessels that have low percentile ranks for VSS but high
for detention. For the evaluation variable detention and combining detention with incidents, Method
B (min) performs best at the top 10% and top 30% level. This is also confirmed by the Satterthwaite
Welch t-test where Method B varies significantly compared to method DET, VSS and Method D at the
top 10% and top 30% level.
Table 5. Reduction in false negatives compared to random selection (top 5% to top 30% of vessels).
Evaluation
Variable
%
Top
Emp.
Count DET VSS A B C D E
VSS 5 756 1.0% −1.6% 0.0% −3.2% −2.7% −1.8% −1.6%
(295,620) 10 756 1.8% −5.5% −0.5% −4.3% −3.6% −5.3% −2.6%
15 756 2.2% −8.9% −1.1% −6.4% −6.3% −7.6% −3.0%
20 756 2.3% −11.5% −3.9% −7.1% −6.9% −11.0% −1.0%
25 756 2.9% −14.0% −6.2% −7.4% −8.1% −12.7% −1.2%
30 756 3.4% −14.1% −6.0% −7.2% −8.8% −14.4% −1.4%
Detained 5 1868 −4.2% −2.0% −3.0% −12.0% −11.8% −10.3% −9.8%
(62,537) 10 1868 −5.9% −5.5% −4.7% −19.0% −17.9% −13.3% −15.5%
15 1868 −7.3% −8.6% −6.4% −22.1% −21.7% −16.4% −17.3%
20 1868 −9.9% −11.1% −7.3% −24.6% −22.3% −18.0% −19.0%
25 1868 −11.1% −13.1% −9.3% −26.5% −22.8% −19.1% −19.2%
30 1868 −14.0% −6.2% −10.5% −27.7% −23.4% −20.2% −19.3%
VSS and 5 2589 −2.7% −1.8% −2.2% −9.4% −9.1% −7.7% −7.4%
detained 10 2589 −3.6% −5.3% −3.4% −14.6% −13.8% −10.8% −11.8%
combined 15 2589 −4.5% −8.5% −4.9% −17.5% −17.1% −13.8% −13.0%
(295,620) 20 2589 −6.3% −11.0% −6.1% −19.6% −17.8% −15.9% −13.6%
25 2589 −7.0% −13.2% −8.2% −21.0% −18.5% −17.1% −13.9%
30 2589 −8.8% −15.4% −9.0% −21.9% −19.1% −18.5% −14.0%
Note: DET = detention, VSS = incident, A (max), B (min), C (mean), D (75%incident/25% detention),
E (25% incident/75% detention)
Figure 4 provides the mean deficiency rate and detention rate of inspected ships and the mean
incident rate of all vessels for each of the suggested risk categories which should be higher for higher
risk categories.
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Note: mean incident rate = sum of incidents/total nr of unique vessels by RC, mean detention rate = sum
of detentions/sum of inspections by RC, mean nr of deficiencies = sum of deficiencies/total nr of unique
inspected vessels.
Figure 4. Incident rate (%), detention rate (%), and mean number of deficiencies per risk category.
The final part of the analysis compares observed incident types with the eight-vessel inspection
priority risk areas. The 817 incidents (including vessels that had more than one incident per quarter,
which is therefore more than the 756 incidents mentioned in Table 5) are manually checked to identify
the first event of what is normally a chain of events. Since an incident can have multiple events and
consequences, this leads to 886 outcomes (84 for VS) linked to the inspection priority risk areas. Vessels
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with high risk (RC1 to RC3) are identified and Table 6 shows the percentage of these vessels to the
total of relevant incidents for each category. Some incident types such as grounding, stranding and
loss of life, have few observations and it is not possible to distinguish between powered and drift
grounding with the available data, hence the comparison is made with grounding/stranding for this
type of category using the same count.
Table 6. Percentage of vessels identified in risk Category 1 to 3 by inspection priority risk areas (2018).
Observed Corresponding VSS VS
Incident Type/First Event Inspection Priority Areas Total RC1-RC3 Total RC1-RC3
Pollution Pollution 52 30.8% 3 0.0%
Loss of life Loss of life 31 12.9% 31 12.9%
Collision/contact Collision and Contact 202 31.2% 5 0.0%
Fire and explosion Fire and Explosion 72 34.7% 12 25.0%
Engine/mechanical failures Engine related failures 317 59.9% 4 50.0%
Propulsion/Steering gear
failure Drift grounding 32 34.4% - n/a
Hull related/stranding Hull related failures 160 33.1% 19 47.4%
Grounding/standing Powered grounding 19 63.2% 10 70.0%
Drift grounding 19 57.9% 10 60.0%
Note: For incident type related to grounding and stranding, inspection priority risk areas for powered groundings
and drift grounding are matched since they cannot be easily distinguished from the observed data.
In the future, vessel inspection priority risk areas can be extended by adding for instance models
related to the maritime labor convention (MLC) and by producing MLC type deficiency probabilities.
Another possible improvement is related to occupational safety type incidents and human error.
The empirical data showed 45 such cases (21 for VS) that cannot be easily matched against any risk
inspection priority areas at this stage but could be in the future if there is a separate risk model for
occupational safety related incidents.
The inspection priority risk areas can also be used to further improve targeting vessels for
inspection in addition to using combined Methods A–E. This idea was tested using the inspection
priority risk areas of the 817 vessels that had incidents with results shown in Table 7. Table 7 shows the
improvement compared to random selection by using the various methods alone and by combining
them with inspection priorities that have high risk ratings (RC1 to RC3). For instance, for Method B,
improvement over random selection is 0.24 (1.24–1) compared to using Method B alone for targeting.
Using at least one of the inspection priorities that have high risk ranking in addition to Method B,
overall improvement is 1.63 (2.63–1) over random selection or 1.39 (2.63–1.24) compared to using
Method B alone. Based on Table 7, using at least four or more inspection priorities with higher risk
rankings in addition to a base targeting method alone (e.g., such as Method B) seems to provide a good
balance between improvement and the number of added vessels that would be selected for inspection
as shown in the last row of Table 7.
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Table 7. Improvement in targeting by adding priority risk areas (relative true positive hit rate).
Methods Random
Using Methods Adding Inspection Priorities Showing High Risk Ranking (RC1 to RC3) with at Least:
Alone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
detention 1 0.88 2.71 2.36 2.04 1.73 1.36 1.20 1.04 0.98
incident (VSS) 1 1.49 2.59 2.19 1.86 1.66 1.54 1.49 1.49 1.49
method A 1 1.20 2.65 2.26 1.90 1.60 1.33 1.23 1.22 1.20
method B 1 1.24 2.63 2.31 2.04 1.82 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.31
method C 1 1.29 2.60 2.27 1.97 1.74 1.49 1.42 1.34 1.32
method D 1 1.49 2.58 2.21 1.89 1.69 1.55 1.50 1.50 1.49
method E 1 1.06 2.68 2.35 2.03 1.76 1.44 1.32 1.20 1.15
Additional vessels selected 343 252 177 117 58 33 16 9
Note: The relative hit rate corrects for different inspection rates and is calculated as follows: % correctly classified/% of vessels inspected which is 30% for RC1 to RC3.
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The selection of how many of the risk priorities need to show a higher risk rating (e.g., 1 to 8) to
be considered for inspection is up to policy makers and available resources. The inspection priority
areas are more refined models (all restricted to VSS incidents) than the base VSS incident model and
are worth been considered is more than three or four show high risk rating as they are also correlated
(please refer to Appendix D, Table A3) indicating if a vessel has higher risk areas in one or two areas,
it most likely will also show higher risk ranking in other areas.
4. Application Example for Inspectors
The approach presented in the previous section provides a data-driven or quantitative approach
to assist selecting vessels for inspection and focusing inspection efforts with the aim to reduce false
negative events. The data-driven part can be combined with other intelligence and expert knowledge
of inspectors to finalize inspection selection and execution. The procedure can be split up into the
following three main steps, where the first two steps can be fully automated and the final step allows
addition of qualitative knowledge and other relevant intelligence.
• Step 1: Use risk formulas that are updated every three to five years to estimate ship-specific
probabilities based on up-to-date data feeds that are received daily or weekly.
• Step 2: Calculate percentile ranks relative to the relevant benchmark sample (e.g., global fleet
or vessels that visited the relevant region during the last three or five years) and classify vessels
into risk categories. Consider inspection priority risk areas to focus inspection activities and to
possibly further improve selection of vessels for inspection.
• Step 3: Combine the outcomes of Steps 1 and 2 with expected arrival data in a particular port
or wider area of interest and plan the inspection visits based on priorities and capacities, taking
the data-driven outcome as guidance. To finalize the inspection planning, use other available
intelligence and expert knowledge, for instance, knowledge about specific companies or vessels
known to inspectors or the region, market economic conditions, or new legislative requirements.
Risk dimensions can be shown graphically as visual assistance to inspectors. Figure 5 provides an
example of 11 vessels that all had incidents, of which only one (container Vessel 5) has been selected
for inspection (with a resulting detention). Such graphs can be generated automatically showing all
vessels in port liable for inspection for a specific day or time period. The graph shows instantly where
each vessel stands with respect to the others. In this particular example, the targeting method using a
top 30% rule for detention only would have missed Vessels 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10. If only incidents (VSS)
are used for targeting, the top 30% rule would have missed Vessels 2, 5, 6 and 9. When using combined
methods with the addition of inspection priority areas, all vessels could be considered for inspection.
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Figure 5. Example of visualization of risk dimensions of vessels in port.
This type of visualization could be complemented by a table (refer to Table 8 for an example) that
lists the percentile ranks of selected methods and the percentile ranks for the vessel inspection priority
risk areas. Note that in this example, all methods are shown. Under real operations, one or two would
be chosen such as Method B, D, VSS and detention to cover all priorities and focuses. With respect to
the inspection priority areas, the following is of interest given that all vessels experienced incidents but
only one was selected for inspection and detained.
• Vessel 1 experienced a steering gear failure and stranded in February 2018. The percentile ranks
for engine related failure is high (87.81) and drift grounding is medium (73.53). It arrived in port
in January 2018 but was not inspected.
• Vessel 3 experienced main engine failures and was towed to port in late June 2018. The percentile
rank for engine failure is high (80.87). It arrived three times in port (April, May and June) but was
not selected for inspection.
• Vessel 4 experienced main engine failure and piston crown damage in late April 201. Its percentile
rank for engine failure is high (85.20). It arrived in port four times prior to within 90 days of the
incident and was not inspected.
• Vessel 8 experienced loss of life by mid Sept 2018. Percentile ranks of all methods are very high
(above 90, and 94.71 for loss of life). It arrived in port twice in August, the last time just two weeks
before the incident, but was not selected for inspection.
• Vessel 10 ran aground late in November 2018, was re-floated and departed. It has very high
percentile ranks for drift grounding (97.41) and hull related failures (95.32). It arrived in port
twice before the incident and was not inspected.
• Vessel 11 experienced engine problems late in October 2018. While its percentile rank of engine
failure is low, the one for drift grounding is medium (78.15).
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Table 8. Summary of percentile ranks of vessels in port.
Percentiles for Targeting Methods
Nr Ship Type DET VSS A(max) B(min) C(mean) D(75/25) E(25/75)
1 oil tanker 83.51 90.45 83.47 93.87 93.05 93.70 90.61
2 dry bulk 85.58 13.92 76.21 24.32 50.93 27.68 71.71
3 LNG tanker 36.84 70.85 55.63 55.42 57.00 65.44 45.47
4 chemical tanker 52.34 86.56 77.66 71.01 76.96 83.85 63.49
5 container 36.51 59.11 40.84 55.09 48.20 54.61 41.81
6 dry bulk 24.75 44.50 25.28 40.46 27.94 37.50 25.05
7 container 58.35 73.82 59.53 76.72 72.79 74.32 64.97
8 general cargo 96.15 94.94 92.89 99.02 98.63 98.33 98.52
9 general cargo 79.12 63.79 66.71 81.28 79.14 72.11 80.40
10 dry bulk 69.54 70.38 54.77 85.47 77.60 74.91 74.16
11 dry bulk 91.06 79.55 84.27 91.72 91.98 88.10 93.13
Percentiles for Vessel Inspection Priorities Risk Areas
Nr Ship Type COLL DRFTGRD POWGRD ENGINE FIRE HULL POL LIFE
1 oil tanker 84.58 73.53 77.77 87.81 96.40 72.62 90.16 95.06
2 dry bulk 13.28 51.20 42.49 64.34 29.82 25.78 3.06 12.84
3 LNG tanker 82.35 77.62 73.85 80.87 53.42 28.78 95.19 91.15
4 chemical tanker 72.25 76.37 75.77 85.20 96.91 78.66 21.65 78.17
5 container 79.22 55.55 42.01 42.91 74.94 50.38 57.49 54.65
6 dry bulk 61.21 38.59 71.39 45.17 69.66 32.83 38.96 12.78
7 container 69.99 40.58 67.44 49.69 14.58 80.09 21.18 75.91
8 general cargo 83.53 89.63 93.62 93.31 8.43 86.70 87.61 94.71
9 general cargo 18.36 20.46 44.36 24.03 29.14 10.03 69.05 15.67
10 dry bulk 59.66 97.41 46.48 59.02 45.05 95.32 35.90 39.41
11 dry bulk 73.46 78.15 79.22 58.47 68.22 82.25 66.59 66.49
Note: DET = detention, VSS = incident, COLL = collisions, DRFTGRD = drift groundings, POWGRD = powered
grounding, ENGINE = engine related failures, FIRE = fire and explosion, HULL = hull related failures,
POL = pollution, LIFE = loss of life. For the color coding of the risk categories, please refer to Table 4 which gives
the percentile rank range for each risk category (RC1 to RC5).
5. Discussion and Conclusions
This study considers and evaluates the status quo assumption of maritime inspections such as
PSC inspections and industry inspections to primarily use past inspection outcomes – in particular
past detention and deficiencies – to target vessels for inspections and to be able to identify future
risky vessels. One of the main goals of inspections is to improve the safety quality of vessels and to
reduce the probability of future incidents. The empirical analysis shows that for the year 2018, 60% of
all vessels with a VSS incident were not inspected in the three months prior to the incident, and of
the 40% that were inspected only 4% were detained. Furthermore, there is a low correlation (−0.04)
between the probabilities of detention and incident (VSS) at ship level which confirms that these two
dimensions measure different risk aspects and that targeting can be improved by combining these two
risk dimensions.
The results further indicate that inspection efforts and inspection risk priorities can be improved
by focusing them in a better way since inspectors could be guided the risk inspection priorities once a
vessel is selected for inspection. One way to improve the effort is to treat detentions and incidents
as two risk dimensions as suggested in this approach and to use methods that combine the two risk
dimensions to target vessels for inspection and to guide the selection of the inspection priorities.
In terms of targeting efficiency, the reduction of false negative events is the focus in order to minimize
the probability that risky vessels are missed as incidents can be very costly.
Five targeting methods that combine the two risk dimensions (detention and incident) using
percentile ranks are developed and tested against random selection of vessels using empirical data for
2018. The results show a potential gain (reduction of false negative events) of 14% to 27% compared
to random selection which can be further improved if adding vessel inspection priority risk areas to
the targeting routine. The study demonstrates that combined methods have the potential to reduce
false negative events as the chance to catch risky vessels is improved. In the future, different weights
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for incident type risk and detention could be tested, especially if a longer time period for testing
becomes available.
The use of percentile ranks makes it possible to combine two risk dimensions and allows
customized benchmarking of vessels, for instance, by considering vessels for a specific country or
region of interest rather than the global fleet used here. Since the percentile ranks are based on a
benchmark sample which could be the global fleet or all vessels that arrived in a specific region over
a time period (e.g., three or five years), the percentile ranks can be customized and are dynamic in
nature since they automatically correct for improvements of the fleet since vessels are always compared
against each other dynamically if the benchmarking routine is run daily or weekly. This approach is
more dynamic to classify vessels compared to, for instance, just using an average detention rate that is
used and not changed for many years.
The study presents risk categories and suggests associated inspection target coverage, which are
tested for feasibility against arrival data of one country. However, these categories and target coverages
are flexible and can be set by policy makers depending on their regional preferences and inspection
capacities, along with the selection of the benchmark sample. It is recommended to customize the
inspection coverage based on regional trade flows, inspection capacities and policies and to evaluate
them yearly or every three years along with the size of the benchmark sample (e.g., all vessel arriving
for the last 3, 5, 6 years etc.)
The study confirms that incident data still has many quality issues and it remains difficult to
use these data to either estimate risk formulas or to validate targeting methods or to determine
incident types related to inspection priority risk areas. This was partly overcome by restricting the
data to VSS incidents, by using raw data from at least three different sources that can be manually
classified. In addition, it is impossible to measure the number of vessels that did not have incidents
due to inspections or that would not have had an incident if they had been inspected which is the
most desirable outcome since inspections should improve safety qualities of vessels and reduce the
likelihood of having an incident later on.
The eight considered vessel inspection priority risk areas provide the means to help inspectors
in focusing their efforts, as these areas provide insight into the individual vessel risk profile. In the
future, these areas could be extended further, for example, by adding Maritime Labor Convention
deficiency type probabilities (e.g., fatigue and working, living and labor conditions) or by revising
the incident type models to include incidents related to equipment failures or occupational incidents.
Other combinations are possible given regional priorities and subject to availability of data.
The data-driven part to assist with targeting and to decide how to focus inspection priorities
can be fully automated. It is simpler to visualize risk dimensions and risk priorities at the level of
vessels that are expected to arrive in a port or in a specific regional area. The visualization can act as
one component in the more complex process to select vessels for inspections and can be combined
with qualitative aspects including other intelligence available and the inspector’s expert knowledge.
These could for instance be mandatory or voluntary incident alerts that are available to some maritime
administrations who are also involved in search and rescue operations. The percentile ranks could also
be used to enhance domain awareness where risk profiles can be attached to Automatic Identification
System (AIS) position records and vessels are monitored via automatic alerts (e.g., a high risk vessels
enters a difficult area to navigate and starts drifting).
It should be acknowledged that the evaluation of new methods as presented here has two
important restrictions. First, the inspection and detention data are the product of current inspection
strategies across the globe and are therefore biased towards current targeting regimes. This means
that potentially risky vessels that would have been detained if they would have been selected for
inspection are not observed and are therefore not part of the empirical dataset used for validation
here. In addition, if an incident was prevented due to an inspection, the desirable outcome cannot
be observed. For this reason, evaluation is made against a random selection benchmark. Second,
the incident data has several limitations. A true test of alternative inspection targeting approaches can
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only be obtained by implementing such approaches for some time to guide the inspection decisions
and by recording some observable outcomes.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Descriptive statistics by ship type of data sets and data feeds used.
Incident Matrix Detention Matrix Count Data Feeds
(2010 to 2014) (2010 to 2014) Per Quarter (2018)
Ship Type Nr Vessels VSS Nr Vessels Detained Indiv. IMO % total
general cargo 98,626 2,428 55,327 3,673 17,576 23.8%
dry bulk 51,250 1,340 38,071 1,524 11,623 15.7%
container 25,435 730 21,042 497 5,178 7.0%
tanker 76,535 1,020 25,347 422 16,358 22.1%
passenger 34,791 1,094 5,808 120 7,142 9.7%
other ship types 89,871 2,262 12,592 222 16,028 21.7%
Total 376,508 8,874 158,187 6,458 73,905 100.0%
Empirical Counts Used for Evaluation - Januar to December 2018
Incident (VSS) VSS/det Combined Detention
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ship Type Count Count Count Count Count Count
general cargo 70,019 285 69,177 1,127 15,025 862
dry bulk 46,373 119 45,808 684 20,570 569
container 20,635 77 20,465 247 8,846 173
tanker 65,320 112 65,136 296 13,062 188
passenger 28,453 115 28,432 136 1,554 25
other ship types 64,064 48 64,013 99 1,612 51
Total 294,864 756 293,031 2589 60,669 1868
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Appendix B
Figure A1. ROC curve—evaluation variable incidents (VSS): total incidents 756.
Figure A2. ROC curve—evaluation variable detention: total detentions 1868.
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Figure A3. ROC curve—evaluation variable VSS and detention: total count 2589.
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Appendix C
Table A2. P values of the Satterthwaite Welch t-test.
Method Random DET VSS B(min)
Very Serious and Serious Incidents (756)
Top10
DET 0.2115 - - -
VSS 0.0016 0.0000 - -
B(min) 0.0118 0.0002 0.5158 -
D(75inc/25det) 0.0020 0.0000 0.9433 0.5628
Top 30
DET 0.0878 - - -
VSS 0.0000 0.0000 - -
B(min) 0.0066 0.0000 0.0064 -
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.8767 0.0040
Detention (1868)
Top10 Random DET VSS B(min)
DET 0.0000 - - -
VSS 0.0000 0.7531 - -
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Top 30
DET 0.0000 - - -
VSS 0.0000 0.1777 - -
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0128 0.0000
Detention and Incidents Combined (2589)
Top10 Random DET VSS B(min)
DET 0.0001 - - -
VSS 0.0000 0.0894 - -
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.001
Top 30
DET 0.0000 - - -
VSS 0.0000 0.0000 - -
B(min) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -
D(75inc/25det) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0278 0.0144
Appendix D
Table A3. Correlation of percentile ranks of vessel inspection priority risk areas.
Area COLL
DRFT
GRD
POW
GRD FIRE HULL LIFE MENG POL
COLL 1.00
DRFTGRD 0.72 1.00
POWGRD 0.60 0.54 1.00
FIRE 0.46 0.24 0.49 1.00
HULL 0.36 0.27 0.56 0.77 1.00
LIFE 0.41 0.23 0.29 0.62 0.53 1.00
MENGINE 0.67 0.85 0.43 0.17 0.13 0.23 1.00
POL 0.38 0.21 0.32 0.49 0.54 0.64 0.20 1.00
Note: COLL = collisions, DRFTGRD = drift groundings, POWGRD = powered grounding, MENG = engine related
failures, FIRE = fire and explosion, HULL = hull related failures, POL = pollution, LIFE = loss of life.
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